Why Literary Time Is Measured in Minutes by Underwood, Ted
WHY LITERARY TIME IS MEASURED IN MINUTES* 
BY TED UNDERWOOD 
 
<341> Seventeen years ago, in an essay titled “Formalism and Time,” 
Catherine Gallagher argued that critics are bad at understanding narrative 
form as something that takes time.1 Instead we try to convert narrative into a 
timeless structure, or condense stories into a few scenes that convey the 
meaning of the whole. Whether it’s Jane Eyre walking back and forth on the 
third story of Thornfield, or Gabriel Conroy watching the snow fall outside 
his window, we understand fiction by identifying moments of heightened 
significance. These could be epiphanies or anticlimaxes. In Gallagher’s view 
the value of these scenes depends less on their specific content than on their 
rhetorical function, which is to reconcile time with timelessness. She sees 
critical tradition as deeply shaped by Walter Pater’s dream of cheating death 
by embracing ephemerality in the form of a single “hard gem-like” moment 
that, paradoxically, becomes eternal.2 A moving aspiration, but also, 
according to Gallagher, a way of undervaluing the dailiness of life, and long 
Victorian novels. 
This would be an interesting argument under any circumstances, but 
it’s a particularly remarkable thing for Gallagher to have written in the year 
2000, when she was also collaborating with Stephen Greenblatt on a 
theoretical defense of New Historicism. After all, the New Historicist critic 
does for historical time exactly what Gallagher’s Paterian critic does for 
narrative—that is, condense it into a brief scene (an anecdote) that 
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crystallizes the meaning latent in a larger mass of events. This mode of 
condensation didn’t flourish in New Historicism by happenstance. Gallagher 
and Greenblatt explicitly theorize the “effect of compression” as an 
appropriately literary approach to history.3 The anecdote becomes for 
historical narrative what the detail is for literary realism, conveying Erich 
Auerbach’s “confidence that in any random fragment plucked from the 
course of a life at any time the totality of its fate is contained and can be 
portrayed.”4 While Gallagher’s essay diagnoses temporal condensation as an 
attempt to evade mortality, her coauthored book presents it as a necessary 
principle of historical understanding, producing “a touch of the real” that 
disrupts the “generalizable typicality” of the “Big Stories” told by Marxist or 
Annaliste historians.5 <342> 
I don’t mean to criticize Gallagher for exploring both sides of this 
issue. Temporal condensation is a rhetorical move, not a policy proposal: it 
may be less important to reach a stable judgment about it than to 
understand its centrality to literary criticism. This centrality has not been 
expressed only through New Historical anecdotes and Auerbachian 
fragments. Literary scholars’ titles are often similarly organized by an 
implicit tableau: The Madwoman in the Attic, “The Halted Traveler,” Learning to 
Curse.6 All of these phrases evoke a brief episode from which we can unfold a 
larger structure of feeling. That leap across scales of time—connecting 
collective history to a moment of individual experience, and lending 
immediacy to the past—is one of the distinctive strengths of literary 
criticism.7 
However, the assumptions underlying this gesture are far from self-
evident. Why are short spans of time so central to our discipline? Novels 
commonly cover twenty or thirty years. In some subgenres (science fiction, 
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James Michener’s epics) it is not unusual to range across centuries. Why is 
experience measured in seconds or minutes more appropriately literary than 
experience measured in weeks or months? 
The question becomes urgent for me because much of my own 
literary research explores long timelines. This is a self-interested choice, not a 
normative stance. I don’t believe that large scales of analysis are more 
important than resonant details. I just find that, in practice, century-
spanning questions tend to be worth investigating, because literary scholars 
have often left questions on that scale unexplored, or at least unresolved. But 
these questions have been left unresolved, of course, because they don’t fit 
our discipline’s rhetorical templates. Where large historical questions could 
be condensed into a single case study, someone else has often already done 
it. The live opportunities I discover tend to be located in aspects of history 
that don’t condense easily—gradual, sprawling trends that can’t be 
represented synecdochically, because their significance depends on the 
relative position of many different examples. 
Gradual and sprawling kinds of change needn’t pose a problem for 
literary research if our discipline is willing to adopt different evidentiary and 
rhetorical strategies for different scales of analysis. But that is often a 
polarizing suggestion. For many literary scholars, a particular, fine-grained 
scale of evidence is bound up with the cultural mission of literary study. We 
have already seen Practicing New Historicism, for instance, champion anecdotes 
against historians’ grands récits. This article will end by challenging the 
assumption that any scale of analysis is uniquely appropriate for literature, 
but I would like to start <343> by understanding the assumption. Why do 
we feel that brief experiences are distinctively literary? 
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In “Formalism and Time,” Gallagher diagnoses critics’ reliance on 
small units of time as an evasion of mortality, but she doesn’t tell us where 
the idea came from. The one clue we might glean is that her story begins 
with fleeting moments of inspiration in Percy Bysshe Shelley’s “Defence of 
Poetry.” This Romantic text may remind us of James Chandler’s England in 
1819, or William Wordsworth’s halted traveler, used by Geoffrey Hartman 
to define the Romantic lyric as “a meditative slowing of time.”8 But it should 
also remind us of something broader than Romanticism: the rise of the lyric 
as the paradigmatic poetic form. In 1848, when Edgar Allan Poe writes that 
“a long poem” is a “contradiction in terms,” we have already taken a big 
step toward identifying literature with brief experiences.9 
But the rise of lyric poetry can’t be the whole story. By the middle of 
the nineteenth century, critics are already taking the novel seriously, so it 
doesn’t seem inevitable that the lyric should have defined the granularity of 
time for all literature. No, the decisive move was the choice to understand 
narrative, too, through representative episodes and moments of lyrical 
insight. It is a choice made explicit in the structure of Mimesis, where 
Auerbach converts three thousand years of the history of narrative into a 
sequence of fragmentary scenes. 
So how did we reach a point where it seemed natural to understand a 
whole novel by focusing on five minutes of the story? How did that become 
not only a valid approach, but—for many scholars—the appropriately 
literary one? 
 
I: THE COMPRESSION OF FICTIONAL TIME 
One plausible lead comes from Auerbach, who quietly acknowledges 
that his own reliance on fragments echoes the fragmentation of time in 
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recent modernist fiction.10 Literary historians are broadly in agreement that 
early twentieth-century fiction had in fact developed new ways to represent 
time by juxtaposing lyrically compressed episodes.11 Gérard Genette credits 
the innovation specifically to Marcel Proust. Before Proust, he says, novelists 
alternated between passages of “scene” and “summary.”12 In a scene, the 
time we spend reading may be loosely equivalent to the time represented in 
the world of the story; events happen, as it were, close up and in slow 
motion. A passage of summary, on the other hand, will quickly traverse 
weeks or months where our protagonist has an illness or learns to love the 
students in her rustic <344> schoolhouse. According to both Auerbach and 
Genette, Proust’s innovation is to cut out the summary and simply juxtapose 
one scene with another.13 Genette characterizes the time that passes between 
these scenes as “ellipsis”: time that must have passed in the story but isn’t 
narrated in the text.14 Replacing summary with ellipsis makes fiction, in 
effect, all scene: all slow motion. Narratologists who aren’t French haven’t 
always given Proust personally this much credit, but they tend to agree that 
the shift toward scene was a modernist innovation.15 
And without distant reading, here is where the article would end, 
because we have a plausible story. The compression of time that began to 
define poetry in the Romantic era spread to fiction later, when modernists 
slowed narration to a phenomenological pace. Gallagher and Auerbach both 
hint at this account. It is a good fit for several examples we are likely to 
remember from Proust, Virginia Woolf, and James Joyce. It could also be a 
polemically useful story—if we wanted to blame our obsession with 
moments, for instance, on the dubious aesthetics of high modernism. In fact, 
this is a great story in every way, as long as we don’t test our memory of 
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three or four examples by gathering a hundred books and comparing them 
in detail. 
How would we do that? Prompted by Genette, my first thought was, 
perhaps we should just measure how much space on the page different 
writers allocate to scene or summary. But, of course, dividing the two is 
going to be hard. How much time has to pass in a scene before it becomes 
summary? The dividing line could shift in different books. And, actually, we 
have no reason to assume that this is a binary division at all. The binary 
contrast between scene and summary is a critical convention unsupported by 
much solid evidence. So here is where numbers start to become useful. We 
don’t have to divide passages into binary categories; instead, we can start by 
treating this as a continuum, and characterize the amount of time that 
elapses in a given passage—whether that’s ten minutes or a month. Later we 
can look at all the passages and ask whether the contrast between passages of 
different lengths gives us evidence for a binary division. 
Our description of elapsed time doesn’t need to be exact. Fictional 
time isn’t exact: how long is a remembered afternoon? We also don’t need to 
be objective. Different people estimate time differently. I collaborated with a 
couple of graduate student colleagues (Sabrina Lee and Jessica Mercado) 
explicitly to acknowledge subjectivity. We divided ninety novels between us, 
and covered almost three hundred years. Some novels were chosen entirely 
randomly from a large digital library. Others were chosen because they were 
bestsellers or prominent <345> in the academic canon: we wanted to make 
it possible to compare different subsets of the literary field. From each novel 
we characterized 16 passages of roughly 250 words each (“roughly” because 
we divided at paragraph and sentence boundaries when possible.) Four of 
the 16 passages were always the first 500 and last 500 words of each novel, 
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because I was curious about the temporal zooming in or out that might 
happen there. We allowed a computer to select the other twelve passages 
randomly from the middle of the narrative. 
Then we tried to say how much time is narrated in each passage. We 
aimed to capture the duration described in the plot—diegetic time, or what 
the Russian formalists called syuzhet—rather than a linear chronology of 
underlying events. We also anticipated a range of familiar paradoxes. For 
instance, a break in narration could be recorded as time that passes in 
ellipsis. At first, we also had a separate category for subjective time, to 
acknowledge memory and anticipation. But as we got a few novels into the 
process it became clear that the boundary between subjective and objective 
time is really a question about scale. For instance, suppose you meet the 
monster in Frankenstein (1818) and he begins to tell his tale. Is narrated 
duration now the hour or so it takes him to talk, or the month he’s 
describing? We decided it’s the month. If the edges of his story fall outside 
our frame of 250 words, we’re inside his narrative. On the other hand, if a 
character says something about her whole childhood in a short passage of 
dialogue, and we can see the edges of that subjective perspective, we count it 
as the minute or two the dialogue would take to speak. In short, we recorded 
what time looks like at a particular textual scale—250 words, a little less than 
a page. Since duration depends on scale, it makes no sense to estimate the 
duration of the whole narrative by multiplying: as if to say, “an hour a page 
multiplied by two hundred pages equals . . .” Narrative is by no means that 
linear. A different scale of measurement would give us a slightly different 
picture; nothing prevents scholars from measuring pace in many different 
ways. 
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So what should we expect to see at the scale of a page? The account 
we get in Genette is that the alternation of scene and summary remained 
fairly stable “up to the end of the nineteenth century.”16 So if we take 16 
passages scattered across each novel, and average them to find out how 
much fictional time typically passes in 250 words, we might expect to see a 
steady pace somewhere between scene and summary: shall we say, roughly 
six hours a page? <346> 
 
Figure 1. In a hypothetical world inferred from narratological criticism (not real data), this image 
describes the average length of time described in 250 words of narration. The vertical axis is a 
logarithmic scale; each dot represents a single work of fiction. 
 
Figure 1 represents a hypothetical world of that kind. On the vertical 
axis is the amount of time narrated, on average, in 250 words. It’s a 
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logarithmic scale, so the distance between 15 minutes and an hour is the 
same as the distance between 6 hours and a day; in both cases we multiply 
by four. The average pace of narration remains more or less stable up to the 
end of the nineteenth century. Then Proust cuts out the summary. Now 
fiction is all scene. Diegetic time gets slower, more phenomenological: there’s 
going to be less time on each page. At first it’s just a few experimental writers 
doing this in English—Woolf and Joyce. But then eventually their example 
diffuses outward, and the pace also drops toward scene in the rest of 
literature. Perhaps in the middle of the twentieth century this effect is further 
amplified by the influence of film and television, which (like most forms of 
drama) tend to equate represented time with the time of representation. 
I’m not arguing that this picture is exactly what you, personally, would 
expect to see. Critical tradition hasn’t posed this question yet with the degree 
of precision implied by Figure 1. So we don’t really have clear, shared 
expectations. But I guarantee that once the actual pattern is revealed, it will 
seem as though we might have guessed whatever it is we do see. A 
phenomenon called hindsight bias makes it easy to conclude retrospectively 
that we already knew, or could easily have inferred, the answer to a problem. 
In distant reading this effect is particularly powerful, because we are forcing 
careful answers to large-scale questions where the discipline has taught itself 
to be content with charismatic guesses. (Genette’s off-hand confidence that 
Proust was responsible for changes in narrative pace is a typical instance.) So 
before revealing any actual evidence, I thought I would share one thing we 
might have guessed <347> if we relied on existing accounts of the history of 
narrative pace drawn from influential scholars like Auerbach, Genette, and 
Seymour Chatman. 
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Figure 2. The average length of time described in 250 words of narration (actual data). The 
vertical axis is a logarithmic scale. The average is calculated as mean(log(passage duration)); the 
sixteen passages sampled from each volume are weighted equally. 
 
Figure 2 is the pattern we actually see. The pace of narration is 
already dropping rapidly in the eighteenth century, and it continues to drop 
to the early twentieth. Then there is perhaps a subtle movement in the other 
direction, or at least a leveling-off. This picture raises doubts about our first 
guess that Romantic lyric initiated the compression of time. And it is almost 
the opposite of the story initiated by modernism <348> we might have 
extracted from Genette. Far from being the moment when a new slower 
pace was introduced, the early twentieth century is the period when the 
slowing stops, or even reverses. 
But debate about modernism is not what I want to dwell on. More 
interesting: the change between the eighteenth century and the twentieth is 
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enormous. The vertical axis is deceptively compressed here, because it’s a 
logarithmic scale. But fiction goes from covering several days on each page, 
to covering roughly thirty minutes. That’s a hundredfold compression of 
time. It must be one of the biggest, simplest changes in the history of fiction, 
bound up (as cause or effect) with many other things. At the scale of thirty 
minutes you’re simply going to narrate different aspects of human life than 
you would narrate at the scale of two days. 
I predicted it would seem that we must have known this already. A 
trend like this seems too big to hide. All the evidence is in the open; the 
volumes used in our study are mostly well-known books. Many of us have 
read, say, half of them. How could we not already know this? 
Figure 2 makes one key reason obvious: while there is an enormous 
difference between the eighteenth-century mean and the twentieth-century 
mean, the variation around the mean in each century is also enormous. A 
pattern like this would be very difficult to infer from memory of eight or ten 
books; you could easily happen to select a group of examples that would 
show little change across the timeline. And of course, we are also averaging 
16 passages from each title in order to infer the average pace for each book. 
If we illustrated pace in the ordinary way, by quoting a passage or two, it 
would be very difficult to reach any conclusion. The pace of narration varies 
too much inside each volume. 
In fact, it would be possible to respond to Figure 2 by asking whether 
changes in the mean pace of narration even matter. If variation around a 
mean is so large that the mean cannot be grasped intuitively by readers, does 
the mean even have literary significance? That is a valid question, and I’ll 
give it detailed examination in a moment. But first I want to point out that 
distant readers are presented with two alternative critiques that cannot be 
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advanced at the same time. On the one hand, we commonly confront the 
objection that our results are too transparent: they are things a reader might 
have guessed intuitively from diffuse recollection. If that turns out not to be 
true, we immediately confront the opposite objection: any pattern that isn’t 
transparently legible in a reader’s memory is rejected, as too subtle to matter. 
<349> 
If any evidence that evades the first of these objections is necessarily 
subject to the second, then distant readers are confronting a form of 
resistance that cannot be changed by evidence at all. Rather, this pair of 
objections seems to express a definitional assumption: literary scholarship is 
simply defined as the reinterpretation of patterns that were already legible in 
a reader’s memory. Any evidence that might have escaped our attention at 
the scale of individual reading is dismissed in advance. If we accept this 
argument, distant reading (and many other kinds of research) become 
impossible. 
For literary research to be possible, there must be some ambiguous 
space between patterns that are transparently legible in our memories and 
patterns that are too diffuse to matter. In fact this ambiguous space is large 
and important. We often dimly intuit literary-historical patterns without 
being able to describe them well or place them precisely on a timeline. For 
instance, students may say that they like contemporary fiction because it has 
more action than older books. I suspect that changes in pacing are part of 
what they mean. There is actually plenty of violence in Robinson Crusoe, but it 
tends to be described from a distance, in summaries that cover an hour or 
two. We don’t see Crusoe’s fingers slipping, one by one, off the edge of a 
cliff. Twentieth-century fiction is closer to the pace of dramatic presentation. 
Protagonists hold their breath; their heartbeat accelerates; time seems to 
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stand still. This pace may feel more like action, or even (paradoxically) faster, 
although diegetic time is actually passing more slowly from one page to the 
next. Even high-school students can feel this difference, although they may 
not describe it well. Narratologists have described it well, but typically credit 
it, mistakenly, to modernism. This change is a real literary phenomenon—in 
fact a huge one. But to trace its history accurately we need numbers. 
Problems like this one are the motivation for distant reading. I have 
borrowed Franco Moretti’s apt phrase for this project, but I want to quickly 
brush away several misunderstandings that have accreted around it. Distant 
reading doesn’t have to involve so-called big data. We are working here with 
ninety books. Nor does the value of distant reading depend on the premise 
that we care equally about canonical and obscure volumes. You will recall 
that we selected these ninety books in several different ways. If we contrast 
the canonical works and bestsellers to the others that were selected 
randomly, it turns out that there is no consistent difference between the three 
sets: the trend at stake here seems to affect literary practice as a whole. We 
fail to grasp the shape of the trend intuitively, not because our reading has 
been <350> limited to the canon, but simply because our memories aren’t as 
good as we like to pretend.17 We may have read these books, but we can’t 
remember them—all at once—well enough to compare them. We may 
dimly realize that a change happened, but to trace the change we will have 
to supplement our memories, and use numbers to measure differences of 
degree. 
 
II: THE ADVANTAGES AND RISKS OF NUMBERS 
Supplementing the human memory does not have to be a high-tech 
project. The works I take as models for distant reading—say, Janice 
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Radway’s Reading the Romance—generally rely on numbers, but not always on 
computers.18 In this project, too, we could have recorded our responses on 
index cards, and used a slide rule for the logarithms. I prefer to call this 
mode of inquiry distant reading—rather than digital humanities—because it 
is fundamentally about a new scale of historical inquiry, not about digital 
technology.19 
Of course, computers do make new things possible. This article can be 
relatively low-tech because it stands at one remove from the text, 
characterizing literature through the responses of readers. But if we wanted 
to grapple more closely with details of literary language across thousands of 
books, new methods drawn from machine learning might become useful. 
Machine learning is a real advance in intellectual history, with broad 
implications for humanists and social scientists. But it is also, of course, a 
complicated and controversial topic, often fused with concerns about the 
growing power of Silicon Valley. To avoid complicating an already complex 
argument, I have deliberately limited this article to older quantitative 
methods (scatterplots, logarithms, curves). None of those things were 
invented in the Bay Area. The charged question they raise is not about 
computers but about the possibility of dialogue between humanists and 
social scientists. I suspect these are also the real stakes of the larger debate 
about digital humanities, but where debates are this impassioned and 
complex, it is wise to proceed one step at a time. 
So the main technological innovation discussed in this article will be a 
very old one: Arabic numerals. We needed numbers to trace changes in the 
pacing of fiction, because those changes only became legible after averaging 
many passages. Numbers can extract a trend from noisy variation. On the 
other hand, because this is a powerful technique, it makes differences visible 
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everywhere: in the real world, no group of books has a mean pace exactly 
the same as another. It thus becomes <351> necessary to evaluate evidence 
cautiously, comparing the trend we have identified to the magnitude of 
random variance. Social scientists have developed standard ways of doing 
this; one widely-used measure is the Pearson correlation coefficient, or r. 
Applying that equation to the pattern in Figure 2, we discover that the 
correlation between a volume’s date of publication and the mean of 
log(passage duration) for that volume is -.64. The negative sign indicates that 
pace goes down as the date goes up. By loose scientific convention, absolute 
values of r around .1 are called small effects; those around .3 are medium-
sized effects; those greater than .5 are large effects.20 We can also evaluate 
the statistical significance of the correlation, which is about eight orders of 
magnitude below the .05 threshold commonly used as a maximum. In 
reality, statistical significance is rarely a sufficient test for distant reading, 
because if there is enough evidence, almost every pattern becomes statistically 
significant. Effect size is a more relevant question, and this is a large effect. 
But the real tests of a quantitative argument are never contained in a 
single number anyway. More often, we want to know whether the pattern 
holds up under different assumptions, and viewed from different angles. One 
advantage of computing is that it becomes easy to pose these skeptical 
questions by subdividing the evidence and comparing different perspectives. 
The code and data underlying this article are available online for researchers 
who want to do that.21 We might, for instance, test alternate metrics. The 
pattern in Figure 2 holds up if we take the median for each volume, rather 
than the mean. Or we might try alternate methods of sampling. In this 
experiment, we always included the first two and last two passages in each 
book. So the beginnings and ends of each story got read much more often 
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than they would have if we were sampling entirely randomly. That’s one 
way of modeling pace, and you might like that model, if you think the 
beginnings and ends of stories are important. But we could alternatively 
down-weight those passages to reflect the fact that they’re sampled from a 
small portion of the text. Figure 3 shows the pattern we get with that 
method. The trend is still clear, and still basically the same, but a little less 
dramatic: it becomes a 70-fold decline instead of a 100-fold (r = -.53, p < 
.000001). I think sampling evenly across a whole narrative is easier to 
explain, so this is the model I have used in figures from here on. You will 
also notice that I have added a gray area around the trend line to reflect 




Figure 3. The average length of time described in 250 words of narration. The average is still 
calculated as mean(log(passage_duration)), but the first two and last two passages are now down-
weighted to reflect over-sampling of the beginning and end of stories. The shaded ribbon 
represents a 95% confidence interval for the dashed curve, which is itself calculated by loess 
regression. 
 
Another set of alternate perspectives we might want to test involves 
the set of books used in the experiment. These questions often get especially 
close scrutiny, because Moretti’s turn-of-the-century articles presented 
distant reading as a way of getting beyond the literary canon—leading to a 
long argument with book historians, who had their own tradition of getting 
beyond the canon by precisely mapping the circulation of editions.22 
Although it may sound plausible that researchers should resolve these 
debates and agree on a representative sample of texts before proceeding, I 
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think that goal can be a red herring. The literary past can be sampled in 
many ways; no single sample is appropriate for all questions. We should 
compare different samples, and computation makes it easy to do that by 
subdividing the evidence. But for many questions—like this one—the 
contrast between canonical works and obscure ones isn’t the point, and 
doesn’t make an enormous difference. Long diachronic patterns tend to be 
robust.23 Narrative pace will vary subtly across different parts of the literary 
field, and those variations are worth exploring in a later phase of research. 
But when literary practice as a whole moves broadly in the <353> same 
direction, it is not always necessary to minutely map synchronic variation 
before acknowledging the diachronic trend. 
 A final skeptical question we might pose involves the alternate 
perspectives of the subjects in the experiment itself. The passages aggregated 
above were read, after all, by three different people, with different 
perceptions of time. So the three of us also read six novels in common and 
compared our reactions to the same passages. We found a lot of agreement; 
across the whole set of shared passages, paired estimates of time correlated 
with each other at r = .78. But this also leaves room for significant 
disagreement, ranging from slightly different guesses about the time it takes 
to eat dinner, to puzzles about the beginning of Ivanhoe (1820), where Walter 
Scott casually juxtaposes a twelfth-century forest to its modern remnants 
(which may or may not be part of the story).  
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Figure 4. The perspectives of three different readers. Scale otherwise as in figure 3. The means for 
Lee, Mercado, and Underwood are represented by black, dashed, and gray lines, respectively. 
 
Does Scott’s forest stretch across 600 years of narration? There is no 
right answer to that, or to most of the other questions we confronted. The 
representation of time in fiction can be dizzyingly subjective, and its 
deviations from linear order have long interested narratologists. <354> 
These slippery questions are absolutely an important topic for research. But 
it is also true that three different readers mostly agreed with each other about 
the duration of many different passages. And when we backed up to average 
all the passages in each book, and plot a curve across historical time, the 
three of us almost entirely agreed about its trajectory (r = .96-.97). This area 
of intersubjective agreement is also an important topic for research, and one 
that literary scholars have not yet explored. 
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I want to pause to underline the word intersubjective. We inherit an 
assumption that quantitative methods produce objectivity, or at least pretend 
to. The history of that straw man is matter for another day, but let me briefly 
offer my view—which is that numbers are no more objective than words. 
They are just signs that allow human observers to wrestle with questions of 
degree. As we back up and look at large historical patterns, we need 
numbers, not because we are trying to be more objective than usual, but 
because our material is becoming more varied and comparisons are 
becoming difficult. We need a way to acknowledge variation, uncertainty, 
and intersubjective disagreement. These complications, often adduced as a 
reason why numbers could never describe literature, are exactly why we 
need numbers to understand long literary timelines. 
 
III: INTERPRETING A MODEL 
After testing this pattern from many different angles, we now have a 
fairly robust model of the relation between historical time and narrative 
pace. Our model is simply the curve in Figure 3. Like other statistical 
models, a curve is a simplified description of a relation between variables. 
This curve may look slightly different from different angles, but it doesn’t 
dissolve. So how should we interpret it? 
I’m writing “interpret,” not “explain,” because I don’t think causal 
questions are always the most interesting ones to ask at this scale. A three-
century trend spanning the Atlantic Ocean is likely to have many causes. It 
will also be hard to separate cause from effect, since the feedback loop from 
cause to effect to cause again will have cycled through many times in the 
course of 300 years. We have been trained to insist, a bit sententiously, on 
the difference between correlation and causation. That difference matters 
 21 
enormously if you’re testing the effect of a new drug. But when you’re 
studying a self-reinforcing cycle across three centuries, it can be close to 
moot. <355> 
So I will discuss causality only briefly, and mainly to fend off a couple 
of tempting assumptions. The first of these is Genette’s notion that narrative 
pace changes when writers just drop the summary and replace it with ellipsis. 
I don’t think there is much truth to that hypothesis. For one thing, the 
division between scene and summary is never crisp. Looking at the 
distribution of passages across different lengths of time (Figure 5), I wouldn’t 
know where to divide scene from summary. In the eighteenth century, there 
seem to be three distinct humps in the distribution (the middle one 
corresponding roughly to the concept of a week). 
 
 
Figure 5. Time narrated in 250-word passages. A density curve is estimated for individual 
passages (not whole books) in each century. 
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It is true that ellipses become more common in the twentieth century. 
Genette is right about that. But outright gaps in narration remain a rare 
phenomenon—too rare to explain the broader change of pace. In fact, the 
books that lead the way by introducing a slower pace are not modernist 
novels experimenting with ellipses, but, if anything, nineteenth-century 
bestsellers like Ivanhoe and East Lynne (1861). 
The second tempting causal explanation I need to fend off may be 
familiar from E. P. Thompson. Industrial capitalism certainly changes 
<356> the organization of time in the process of disciplining work. 
Thompson famously connects this to the diffusion of watches, which help 
people measure smaller units of time. It seems intuitively plausible that 
fiction might have adapted itself to this more finely-divided, closely-
regulated, industrial world.24 
And indeed that may be some part of the explanation for temporal 
compression.25 But it can’t be the whole explanation, because the trend we 
see in fiction isn’t found in other forms of narrative. If this were just a 
broadly social change in the experience of time, we might expect it to affect 
nonfiction as well. For instance, biographies and autobiographies are also 
narratives centrally concerned, like novels, with individual experience. But in 
those genres, the pace of narration doesn’t seem to change as it changes in 
the novel. I haven’t tagged as many biographies, and they are very diverse, 
so I can’t say confidently whether the pace of narration increases or 
decreases in biography. That is why the shaded band in Figure 6 is so wide 
for that genre. But certainly there is no evidence yet for the kind of clear 
deceleration we see in fiction. 
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Figure 6. Weighted average of 250-word passages in fiction and biography. 
 
<357> In fact the changes we see in fiction might be caused by what 
Emile Durkheim called structural differentiation—which leads institutions to 
specialize in distinct social niches.26 In other research, I have encountered 
further evidence that biography and fiction were differentiating; I won’t go 
into it deeply here because I have promised not to rely on machine learning 
in this article, but let’s just say that as we proceed down the timeline, 
predictive algorithms find it easier to tell biographies and works of fiction 
apart in a blind taste test. The genres become textually less similar in many 
ways, not just in their relation to time. 
So, I admit, it is tempting to explain changes in narrative pace as a 
symptom of a general differentiating process that separated fiction ever more 
firmly from other genres of narrative. But I will resist the temptation to 
advance that as a causal argument, at least for now. We haven’t fully 
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described this trend yet. Instead of rushing to explain it causally, let’s thicken 
our description by looking for textual patterns and literary pleasures bound 
up with the change. That can be another way of answering the why question. 
It may not explain agency—Aristotle’s efficient cause—but it could help us 
understand purpose, or formal cause. What, in other words, did writers 
achieve by compressing fictional time? 
One pleasure bound up with this change is overt and naïve. I’m going 
to call it breathless narration—a narrative strategy that draws attention to 
the compression of time and presents it as a source of thrilling surprise. 
Perhaps the ur-text for this is Samuel Richardson’s Pamela (1740), where 
narration can be literally breathless because its epistolary context is 
dramatized: I have to finish writing before Mr—bless me, there is Mr B at 
my door right now! But those tricks have limits; eventually you get mocked 
by Henry Fielding. By the late eighteenth century, novelists were working 
out a subtler and more durable stance of breathlessness. Maybe narrators 
can’t literally describe events as they happen, but they can still describe 
events in a way that highlights their immediacy. This is one of the things that 
makes Frances Burney sound more modern than Daniel Defoe; she keeps 
reminding her readers that events are succeeding each other quickly. A new 
paragraph will begin “A few moments after he was gone[,]” or “At that 
moment Sir Robert himself burst into the Room[.]”27 Ann Radcliffe 
similarly intensifies events by making them happen “at the very moment” 
something else does.28 
The gesture feels naïve because it attempts something that narrative 
cannot literally achieve. Writers have many ways to create intensity—
diction, suspense, conflict. But breathless narration seems to create <358> 
intensity by impressing the reader with the number of events crammed into a 
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small space of represented time. The problem is that we don’t directly 
experience represented time, and aren’t necessarily startled by its 
compression. The editor of a music video can overwhelm a viewer with 
rapid jump cuts. But if the eventfulness of narration really began to startle a 
reader, they could just turn pages more slowly. And yet, breathlessness is a 
very popular narrative stance—so popular that on some level it must work. 
Although breathlessness may seem naïve, it is often flagged self-
consciously—for instance when characters do something “in much less time 
than it takes to write it.”29 Acknowledging the difference between space on 
the page and fictional time may sound like an apology. But more often, the 
breathless narrator is boasting about the brevity of represented time. You 
can feel this sort of pride when Philip Marlowe writes, at the end of The Big 
Sleep: “I rang the bell. It had been five days since I rang it for the first time. It 
felt like a year.”30 Here Marlowe anticipates the reader’s sense that many 
narrative twists have been packed (a bit implausibly?) into a short space of 
represented time, and turns that compression into yet another occasion for 
hard-boiled weariness. L. A. is a tough town for a narrator; you really earn 
that 50 dollars a day plus expenses. 
But while the self-consciousness of breathless narration is odd and 
interesting, it probably isn’t the main pleasure produced by the steadily 
slowing pace of fiction over the last three centuries. The compression of time 
also accompanied bigger, simpler shifts of emphasis. In particular, it was 
strongly associated with dialogue and with insistently physical description.  
The effect of dialogue is easy to understand: since it takes roughly the 
same time to read dialogue that it would take to speak it, dialogue necessarily 
slows down the passage of represented time.31 Since this effect is fairly 
obvious, I thought the slowing pace of fiction would correlate very closely 
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with the amount of space spent on dialogue, and there is in fact a medium-
sized correlation (r = -.28). 
But changes in narrative pace correlate even more closely with rising 
emphasis on concrete description. There are many ways to measure this. For 
convenience, I’m going to borrow a measure that was developed in the 
Stanford Literary Lab. It is simply a list of words that tend to be used in 
physical description: directional prepositions, like “up” or “down,” physical 
verbs like “walk,” physical adjectives, numbers, and body parts.32 A list like 
this isn’t a perfect or stable measure. Words have multiple meanings, and the 
definition of concreteness can change <359> across time. But the changes 
aren’t huge, and as Figure 7 shows, this list works in practice very well across 
three centuries, organizing biographies and fiction as a single pattern (r = -
.60).33 This tendency for slow narration to accompany sensory, spatial 
description may be why we assume that a critical method organized around 
brief spans of time will go hand in hand with concrete particularity. That 
pairing isn’t inevitable: in principle, you could spend a page slowly 
describing ten seconds of abstract thought, and some novelists do. But 
usually, slowing the pace of narration to a scale of minutes has meant 
increasing the amount of sensory detail. 
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Figure 7. The pace of narration, and the prevalence of concrete diction. Each point represents a 
volume of biography or fiction. A slower pace correlates with more concrete description (r = -.60). 
Both things are also more common in twentieth-century fiction than in biography, or earlier 
fiction. 
 
This tells us, perhaps not why, but how the pace of fiction changed, and 
what pleasures were thereby produced. The slowing pace of fiction is 
strongly bound up with the prominence of dialogue and physical description, 
across a span of 300 years. I have described this shift as an attempt to 
emulate the immediacy of dramatic presentation. That’s not a radically new 
idea; in the 1920s, Percy Lubbock already saw that fiction had been moving 
toward “showing” rather than “telling” in the <360> late nineteenth 
century.34 But now, we have stepped far enough back to see Lubbock’s 
argument as part of a much bigger picture. This was not, as Lubbock 
suggests, an innovation made by Gustave Flaubert or Henry James; it was a 
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200-year trend that transformed time in fiction, moving it steadily from a 
scale of days to a scale of minutes. Popular fiction, like Scott’s Ivanhoe and 
Ellen Wood’s East Lynne, played as big a role in this process as James did. 
 
IV: THE TIMELINE AND THE ANECDOTE 
 The New Historical anecdote often runs longer than 30 minutes. It is 
not literally the same thing as a fictional scene. Nor did it rise to prominence 
in literary criticism at exactly the same time as the (eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century) shifts in narrative we have been tracing. But I do think 
the preference for brief scenes in fiction eventually produced a similar 
preference in literary criticism. Changes in the pacing of fiction 
accompanied, and helped consolidate, a belief that literature is distinguished 
from other forms of language by attention to the immediacy of individual 
experience. By the middle of the twentieth century this insistence on 
immediacy was also defining a regulative boundary between literary criticism 
and other academic disciplines. 
The opening pages of this article have already sketched a few links in 
this genealogy. Auerbach, for instance, explicitly based the structure of 
Mimesis on modernist writers’ treatment of time. Gallagher and Greenblatt 
similarly invoked the temporal condensation of the realist detail to justify 
their own anecdotal method. The New Critics don’t always insist overtly on 
temporal compression (in part because you hardly need to belabor that point 
if you’re writing about lyric poetry), but they too defined literature through 
its qualities of immediacy and concreteness. 
All of these critical texts are at least a few decades old. But the notion 
that literature is defined by temporal compression has lost none of its power: 
it still governs critical discourse today. A good example can be found in the 
 29 
introduction to a recent special issue of Genre, where Jesse Rosenthal 
translates controversies about the scale of distant reading into a deeper 
struggle between “narrative” and “data.”35 For Rosenthal, the power of data 
is displayed in visualization, which he understands as essentially timeless. Dr. 
John Snow’s famous map of cholera, he points out, “works by collapsing the 
temporal dimension,” so we can see all the cholera cases in September 1854 
as points in a single image.36 By contrast, “the experience of narrative is one 
that takes <361> place over time,” so “narrative will tend to resist this sort of 
significance-through-aggregation.”37 A novel inevitably treats different 
illnesses as separate moments in a sequence: temporality leads to 
individuation. 
One could quibble about the implicit assumption here that images are 
perceived all at once. In practice, timelines are read from left to right, rather 
like a line of type. But Rosenthal is introducing a special issue about the 
Victorian novel, and he is basically right about differences of scale in the 
nineteenth-century examples he considers. John Snow’s map does compress 
a whole month into a single image. By contrast, Victorian novels unfold on a 
scale where each telltale cough, each fever, each touching episode of 
delirium must be described separately.  
But I hope this essay has prepared readers to see that the Victorian 
novel’s particular approach to pacing is not the same as that of narrative or 
literature in general. Consider, for instance, Defoe’s Journal of the Plague Year: 
“[T]he next week there seemed to be some hopes again; the bills were low, 
the number of the dead in all was but 388, there was none of the plague, and 
but four of the spotted-fever.”38 For Defoe’s narrator, a week of contagion 
killing 388 people can be a narrative unit just as reasonable as a single 
pathetic cough might be for Charles Dickens. On some pages, the narrator 
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backs up to give us a table that covers actuarial figures for several parishes 
across a whole month—a scale of aggregation closely comparable to John 
Snow’s street map of London. 
A Journal of the Plague Year is not exactly a typical work of fiction, but it 
is not an outlier either. Actuarial tables may not be common in novels, but 
the evidence surveyed above shows that it is quite common for early-
eighteenth-century fiction to treat weeks and months as narrative units. In 
light of that evidence, it should be clear that there is nothing timeless, hostile 
to narrative, or inherently unliterary about a map of London that covers all 
of September 1854. September is just a unit of time a bit larger than 
novelists and literary critics have recently taken as normative.  
In placing Rosenthal next to Auerbach, Gallagher, and Greenblatt, I 
am taking him as characteristic of literary study at its best. Although 
Rosenthal’s introduction is titled “Narrative Against Data,” it is never one-
sided; in fact, it characterizes the encounter of “narrative” and “data” as “an 
exciting one.”39 But at the same time, it is centrally concerned to define 
“data-driven approaches” as “a different thing altogether” from “traditional 
literary criticism.”40 I think this ambivalent response to distant reading 
typifies contemporary literary study. We <362> are an open-minded 
discipline, but also nervous about the porosity of our borders. Many literary 
scholars are intrigued by quantitative methods, and willing to see them 
explored—as long as a protective firewall of some kind can be guaranteed. 
For instance, we could posit in advance that numbers are incapable of 
capturing the truly literary aspects of literature, such as fine divisions of time. 
If numbers are about months or years, and narratives about minutes, then it 
might be safe for literary scholars to work with data, precisely because data 
can never touch the beating heart of our subject. 
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The impulse to reinforce disciplinary borders is by no means unique 
to Rosenthal. Many other scholars have emphasized the brevity of literary 
experience in order to distinguish properly literary analysis from social 
science and historical narrative. Gallagher and Greenblatt, for instance, 
described New Historicism as a systematic reassertion of the brief 
Auerbachian fragment against Marxist and Annaliste generalization. 
Perhaps taking a long view of these controversies can reduce some of the 
tension surrounding them. Disciplines change slowly, and the real stakes of 
theoretical debate are often lower than we pretend. Although quantitative 
social science has loomed on the horizon of the humanities for many 
decades, large scales of quantitative analysis have never replaced other 
approaches to the human past, and the inroads they are making in the 
humanities today remain rather marginal and modest. 
Moreover, the pleasures that currently attract students to literary study 
guarantee that the literary humanities, in particular, will remain centered on 
a phenomenological scale of description. This article has criticized presentist 
assumptions about the scale of literary experience. Literary time was not 
always measured in minutes; narrators have not always insisted so fiercely on 
the concrete particularity of brief events. But characterizing these 
assumptions as presentist cuts both ways, since the present is after all where 
we spend most of our lives. In the process of showing that literature was not 
always defined by temporal immediacy, I have also acknowledged that 
temporal immediacy is now an important boundary separating literary 
language from nonfiction. Students become English majors, and eventually 
English professors, because they love vivid fragments of individual 
experience. So distant readers who want to persuade English professors will 
need to keep imitating the strengths of post-Romantic literature. We will 
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have to keep using anecdotes and close readings, as well as graphs and maps, 
when we address a disciplinary audience. <363> 
In short, there is very little danger that recent quantitative 
experiments will displace a conception of literature that has been three 
centuries in the making. Literary scholars’ preference for close description of 
finely-divided moments is already buttressed by the recent history of 
literature itself. It doesn’t need to be further buttressed by universalizing 
arguments about the proper scale of truly literary analysis. The real dangers 
for our discipline lie elsewhere, and erecting higher walls between 
“narrative” and “data” will not protect us from them. The future that should 
worry literary scholars is not that quantitative methods will spread too 
rapidly in our discipline. It is more likely that the inertia of literary curricula 
will repel new questions requiring statistical training only too effectively. In 
that case, exciting discoveries about the longue durée of literary history could 
be made in other disciplines—like Communications or Information 
Science—where quantitative research finds a more receptive curricular soil. 
 That is a likely future, and not necessarily a bad one, but I don’t think 
it is the best one we could create. I would rather see distant reading find at 
least part of its home in literary studies. But that can only happen where 
literature departments are confident enough to stop building firewalls against 
quantitative social science, and instead assimilate numbers as one part of a 
diverse toolkit. In any case, I plan to continue working across this divide. I 
see close readings and statistical models not as competing epistemologies but 
as interlocking modes of interpretation that excel at different scales of 
analysis. Histories of broad trends will often need to pause for close 
description—for instance, of a passage or two from Burney—in order to 
understand the human significance of a trend. But the converse is also true. 
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If we want to understand how case studies fit together to form literary 
history, we will need more than our unaided memories. Even scholars who 
are interested strictly in canonical writers will sometimes need to measure 
questions of degree across a long timeline. Otherwise we can end up giving 
Joyce and Proust credit for changes that actually sprawled across several 
centuries. 
Far from threatening each other, quantitative and qualitative 
interpretation are mutually illuminating. In fact, this article has tried to show 
that large-scale quantitative analysis can cast light even on our reasons for 
valuing brief scenes and gem-like moments. The timeline and the anecdote 
are not just compatible, but complementary ways of thinking about the past; 
each perspective needs the other to better understand itself. 
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